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PREFERENCE STRENGTH AND 
TWO KINDS OF ORDINALISM* 
ALLAN F. GIBBARD 
In his paper "Extended Sympathy and the Possibility of Social 
Choice", Professor Arrow first considers an approach to individual 
utilities which is "strictly ordinal" and rules out interpersonal 
comparisons. This is the approach he took when he formulated his 
original impossibility theorem [1]. He then takes up an approach 
which allows interperso~al comparisons, but only of an ordinal kind. 
The strictly ordinal approach without interpersonal comparisons 
turns out to lead to a dead end, and the second approach - the one 
that allows interpersonal comparisons of an ordinal kind alone - 
leads either to lexical mz'ximax or to lexical maximin. What are we 
to make of ~11 this? 
The approach without interpersonal comparisons leads to a dead 
end in the sense that it is inconsistent with certain other conditions: 
in the version of the Arrow theorem in the paper I am discussing, 
with the conditions of Binary Relevancy, Anonymity, and the Weak 
Pareto Principle. A further condition is built into the formalism 
Arrow uses: that the just or optimal alternatives from among the 
feasible alternatives are determined by a weak ordering which is 
independent of the feasibility of alternatives. The ordinal approach 
without interpersonal comparisons, then, is discredited by the Arrow 
theorem only in so far as these other conditions are plausible. 
Just what, more precisely, is the approach that is supposed to 
lead to trouble? I can think of two positions the term 'a strictly 
ordinal approach' might designate; I shall call them 'Basic Ordi- 
nalism' and 'Pairwise Ordinalism'. One is this. 
Basic Ordinalism: The only meaningful statements that can be 
made expressing a person's preference are those that can be 
derived from his preference ordering of the alternatives. 
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This seems to be the view that motivates the condition of Ordinal 
Invariance. According to Basic Ordinalism, any two individual utility 
scales that give the same ordering of the alternatives express the 
same information. Now a mere difference in the form in which 
information is expressed should not affect the conclusions that are 
drawn from that information. In particular, the form in which 
information about individual preferences is expressed should not 
affect conclusions about which states are optimal or just. The 
condition of Ordinal Invariance ought therefore to obtain. 
An ordinalist might want to make a further claim. 
Pairwise Ordinalism: For any pair of alternatives x and y, the 
only meaningful statements that can be made expressing a 
person's preferences between x and y are those that can be 
derived from the statement that he prefers x to y, the statement 
that he is indifferent between x and y, or the statement that he 
prefers y to x. 
This claim is not a logical consequence of Basic Ordinalism, and a 
proponent of Basic Ordinalism might have good reason for rejecting 
Pairwise Ordinalism. 
What information, for instance, did Patrick Henry convey when 
he said "Give me liberty or give me death"? The datum he evinced 
was ordinal: He said in effect that he preferred death (D) to life 
under tyranny (T). Context made it clear that he preferred life with 
liberty (L) to death, and so we have his preference ordering LDT. 
Now on the basis of this ordinal information, in the absence of any 
indications to the contrary, it would be natural to conclude that 
Henry's preference for life with liberty over life under tyranny was 
extremely strong. That, indeed, must have been what Henry meant 
to convey. A proponent of Basic Ordinalism, then, might plausibly 
reject Pairwise Ordinalism; he will do so if he thinks that Patrick 
Henry's preference ordering indicates a strong preference for life 
with liberty over life under tyranny. 
In one sense, a basic ordinalist rejects the possibility of inter- 
personal comparisons of utility: he thinks that once each person's 
preference ordering of  the alternatives has been given, there is 
nothing further to be said about peoples' comparative strengths of 
preference or the comparative levels of satisfaction which a given 
alternative would bring them. In another sense, a basic ordinalist 
may think interpersonal comparisons possible. He may think that a 
person's entire preference ordering bears on the question of how 
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seriously a preference of his between a given pair of alternatives 
should be taken, and in particular, on how strong that preference 
should be regarded as being. 
Now suppose I do think so. Then although I think that any two 
utility scales that are ordinally the same give the same information, I 
may think that some scales give their information more per- 
spicuously than others: that on some scales, the difference between 
the utility numbers of  two alternatives reflects the strength of 
preference which the ordering given by the scale indicates, whereas 
on other scales, differences in utility numbers have no such signifi- 
cance. More to the point, I may think that the interpersonal 
comparisons indicated by some pairs of  utility scales are misleading. 
Call an assignment of a utility scale to each person a utility pro#le; a 
utility profde that assigns each person i a scale u, will be written u. 
We can talk of a utility profile as being perspicuous or 
imperspicuous. I shall not define these notions precisely, but the 
rough idea is this: a utility profde u is perspicuous if for any two 
people i and / and states of the world w, x, y, and z such that 
Ui(W J>Ui(X ) and ui[y J>ui(z ), the ratio of Ui(WJ-Ui(X ) to ui(y )-ui(z } 
is the ratio of  the strength of i ' s  preference for w over x, as indicated 
by the preference ordering given by scale u, to the strength o f / ' s  
preference for y over z as indicated in a like way by scale u. 
When I talk of the strength of a preference "as indicated by" a 
preference ordering, 1 have in mind two views a basic ordinalist 
might hold. One is that from a person's preference ordering of all 
conceivable alternatives, one can precisely determine the strength of 
any of his preferences between pairs of alternatives. A second 
possible basic ordinalist position is this. First, consider how a naive 
account of preference strength might go. On this naive account, 
peoples' preferences have definite strengths, and, as in the case of 
Patrick Henry, a person's preference ordering of all conceivable 
alternatives gives indications of the strengths of his various prefer- 
ences. Indications of strength, though, are all that his ordering gives; 
one cannot use the ordering to deduce precise strengths of prefer- 
ence. We must therefore distinguish between a person's genuine 
strength of preference and his indicated strength of preference. Turn 
now to the basic ordinalist position I want to sketch. On this view, 
the naive notion of genuine strength of preference is not, strictly 
speaking, empirically meaningful. The notion of indicated strength 
of preference, on the other hand, has an empirical content, since 
claims about indicated strength of preference can be tested by 
observations that give a person's preference ordering. On this view, a 
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perspicuous utility prof'de is a profde such that ratios of utility 
differences, as given by that profde, are ratios of indicated strengths 
of preference - not ratios of genuine strengths of  preference, for 
those ratios are empirically meaningless. 
How, now,  does the distinction between Basic Ordinalism and 
Pairwise Ordinalism bear on the Arrow theorem, and on the results 
by Hammond and Strasnick which Arrow reports? A pairwise 
ordinalist may well fall prey to the Arrow theorem. He denies that 
there is any distinction to be made between perspicuous and 
imperspicuous utility profiles. Suppose he also believes the following: 
Determination by 
just than a state 
between x and y. 
Pairwise Preferences: Whether a state x is more 
y depends only on individuals' preferences 
Since he thinks that preferences are equally well displayed by any 
utility profile, he will accept Binary Relevancy: 
For any u, u', x, and y, if ui(xJ = ui(x) and ui(y) = ui(y] for all i, 
then x f ( u ' ) y  i fx  f(u)y.  
(Here and in what follows, variables w, x, y, and z will take 
alternatives as values; variables i,/', and k, the n people in question. I 
am interpreting x f ( u ) y  as saying that if each person's preferences 
were correctly given by the scale which utility profde u assigns him, 
then x would be more just than y.) Once he accepts Binary 
Relevancy, he is most of the way to the Arrow contradiction. As an 
ordinalist, he accepts Ordinal Invariance. Anonymity and the Weak 
Pareto Condition are innocuous (and in any case could be weakened 
considerably without losing the impossibility result. See, for 
instance, Hansson, [2: pp. 27-9.]). One further assumption is 
enough to yield the contradiction: that the relation "is more just 
than" is an ordering. 
A proponent of Basic Ordinalism, on the other hand, may hold 
that some utility profiles are perspicuous whereas others are not. He 
may, on that account, accept Determination by Pairwise Preferences, 
but accept Binary Relevancy only with the restriction that the 
profiles in question, u and u', be perspicuous. For suppose profiles u 
and u', are imperspicuous, and that Ui(XJ>ui(y ]. Even ifui'(XJ=Ui(X] 
and u~.(y) = ui(y), that in no way shows that the strength of 
preference for x over y which the entire scale ul indicates is the 
same as the strength of preference for x over y which the entire scale 
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u i indicates. If  a utility profile is imperspicuous, then by ignoring a 
person's rankings of  alternatives other than x and y and looking only 
at the utility numbers of  x and y as given by that prof'de, one loses 
information about the strength of preference for x ove ry  which his 
entire ranking indicates. 
Now if a basic ordinalist accepts Binary Relevancy only with a 
perspicuity rider, he can avoid impossibility results. That is not to 
say that any view whatsoever of  what makes a utility profile 
perspicuous would, when formulated as a rider on the condition of 
Binary Relevancy, block impossibility results. It is to say that some 
perspicuity riders would do the job. 
The easiest example is this: Suppose the alternatives are finitely 
many. Call a utility profile perspicuous if f for any i and x, ul(x) is 
the number of  alternatives i ranks below x. A basic ordinalist might 
then accept the following principle of  Restricted Binary Relevancy: 
For any x and y, and any two perspicuous utility profdes u and u', 
t I . t . 
if u~[x) -~ ui(x) and u~[y) = ui(Y) for all t then xf(u )y If f xf(u)y. 
He can then consistently also accept the conditions of  Ordinal 
Invariance, Anonymity,  and Weak Pareto Principle, and he can 
accept that the relation is more just than is a weak ordering 
independent of  the feasibility of  alternatives. One social welfare 
function which satisfies all these conditions might be called 
Utilitarianism: 
For all u, x, and y, x f(u) y if ~i ui(x)>Y~i ut(y) for the 
perspicuous utility profile u' which is ordinally the same as u - 
that is, such that for all i, w, and z, u i (w)>ui(z ) i f  f u'i(w)>u'l(z). 
With 'perspicuous' defined as it is here, Utilitarianism is equivalent 
to the Borda Rule: For each person, assign each alternative as many 
points as there are alternatives below it on his utility scale, add up 
the points each alternative gets, and order the alternatives by their 
point totals. 1 leave it to the reader to check that with 'perspicuous' 
defined as it has been, Utilitarianism as characterized here does 
satisfy the conditions I claim it to satisfy. 
A slightly more plausible view that a minimal ordinalist might 
take is this. He might hold that what is just should be decided on the 
assumptions that each person's degrees of  liking are distributed 
normally and that everyone has the same standard deviation for this 
distribution. He could then consider a utility profile perspicuous if, 
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on each person's utility scale, the utilities of the alternatives are 
distributed normally and all these distributions have the same 
standard deviation. With a suitable definition of the term 'dis- 
tributed normally', this would presumably entail that if two per- 
spicuous utility profdes u and u' are ordinally the same, then u' 
differs from u at most by everyone's scale being stretched or 
compressed by a uniform positive factor, and by individuals' scales 
being moved uniformly up or down. We will, in other words, have 
the following principle of Comparative Interval lnvariance: 
For any two perspicuous utility profiles u and u' that are 
ordinalgy the same, and there are real numbers a>O and bt ..... bn 
such that for each person i and alternative x, ui(x) = aul(xJ+bi. 
Therefore, for any two alternatives x andy and any two perspicuous 
utility profiles u and u' that are ordinally the same, we will have 
u/(x]> ~i ui[Y) if f Y'i ulfx)~>~i uify]. 
This new definition of the term 'perspicuous' will give a new content 
to the definitions of  Restricted Binary Relevancy and Utilitarianism 
which were formulated earlier. I leave it to the reader to check that 
Utilitarianism, in this new sense, satisfies Ordinal Invariance, 
Anonymity, the Weak Pareto Principle, and Restricted Binary 
Relevancy as now understood. 
What I am saying in essence is this: One may consistently believe 
that interpersonal comparisons of strength of preference - or 
perhaps of indicated strength of preference - are possible, and still 
accept Basic Ordinalism. To do so, one must believe that the 
information needed for ma l~g  these interpersonal comparisons is 
contained in the preference orderings of the people involved. A 
person who holds this view will reject Pairwise Ordinalism. He may 
accept Determination by Pairwise Preferences, but he will not on 
that account accept the principle of Binary Relevancy unless it is 
restricted to "perspicuous" utility profiles. He can then consistently 
accept Ordinal Invariance, Anonymity, the Weak Pareto Principle, 
and the view that the relation is more ]ust than is an ordering (with 
ties allowed), and still take a utilitarian position. I have sketched two 
ways of doing all this, and considerations like those in the Patrick 
Henry example may suggest more reasonable ways of gleaning 
indications of comparative strength of preference from ordinal 
information. 
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Suppose now a basic ordinalist of the kind I have pictured is 
persuaded to relax his basic Ordinalism, and accept interpersonal 
comparisons of utility levels at the outset. Suppose, in other words, 
he now thinks possible interpersonal comparisons of  utility levels 
that are not derived from the preference orderings of  the people 
involved. That will not drive him to accept a maximax or maximin 
position. His conversion will amount to a liberalization of the 
constraints he sets on a social welfare function: in place of Ordinal 
Invariance, he will accept the weaker condition of Coordinal 
Invariance. That leaves open to him all the social welfare functions 
he before found acceptable, and so in particular, if he previously 
he before found acceptable, and so in particular, if he previously 
took the sort of utilitarian position that I have sketched, he can 
continue to do so. 
I have not so far been evaluating Basic Ordinalism; I have only 
been sketching various positions a basic ordinalist might take. How 
well-founded is Basic Ordinalism? 
One possible objection to it will not work. It is clear, an objector 
might say, that we do make interpersonal comparisons of strength of 
preference, and that we sometimes do so with good justification. 
Any theory that says that we cannot make such comparisons is at 
odds with a fact more evident than the theory itself. Now it should 
be clear from what 1 have said that the basic ordinalist can accept 
most of this. We do sometimes justifiably make interpersonal 
comparisons of strength of preferences, he can agree, or at least of 
indicated strength of preference. When we do so, though, the basis 
of our judgment still lies in the preference orderings of  the people in 
question. When, for instance, we ascribe to Patrick Henry an 
extremely strong preference, for life under liberty to life under 
tyranny, we do so on the basis of his preference for death over life 
under tyranny. The issue between a basic ordinalist and his oppo- 
nents is not whether we can make justified interpersonal compari- 
sons of preference strength, but whether such comparisons give infor- 
mation that is not derivable from the preference orderings of the 
people concerned. 
The appeal of Basic Ordinalism is epistemological. One way the 
argument for it might be put is this. The theory that ascribes a 
utility scale to a person (and hence allows comparisons of strength 
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of preference and the theory that utility scales are observationally 
equivalent. For what is explained by ascribing a utility scale to a 
person is the choices he is disposed to make and those same 
dispositions to choose can be equally well explained simply by 
ascribing a preference ordering to him. Now if two theories are 
observationally equivalent, the more austere one is to be preferred, 
and statements in the language of the less austere theory are 
meaningful only in so far as what they convey can be expressed in 
the language of the more austere theory. A utility scale, then, is 
meaningful only in so far as what it conveys can be expressed by a 
preference ordering; thus two utility scales that give the same 
ordering convey the same meaning. 
How good is this argument? I can give almost nothing in the way 
of an answer here; I shall only touch on some ways the argument 
might be appraised. In the first place, I think that the vague theory 
of meaningfulness the argument invokes - or something like it - is 
correct. It is sometimes legitimate to reject a common sense concept 
as empirically meaningless; the concept of absolute distant simul- 
taneity in physics is a prime example. When such conceptual pruning 
is legitimate, I think, it is because the concept rejected has no 
explanatory power: because we believe that everything observable 
can be at least as well explained without the concept as with it. The 
test of whether ordinally like utility scales convey the same informa- 
tion, then, is one of explanatory power. The question is whether 
everything that can be explained with utility scales can be equally 
well explained ordinaUy. 
One way of answering this question will not help us. Choices 
among gambles, it might be thought, are better explained by 
expected utility maximization than they can be by means of any 
purely ordinal theory. Since two utility scales that are ordinally alike 
will sometimes, on tthe hypothesis of expected utility maximization, 
yield different choices among gambles, the difference between two 
such scales may be empirically significant. Even should all this be so, 
though, it will not dissolve the Arrow paradox. Choices among 
gambles will not distinguish between scales derived from each other 
by a positive affine transformation (that is, by a uniform expansion 
or contraction, a uniform raising or lowering, or a combination of 
the two). If such scales are not distinguished, the Arrow paradox 
remains. (See [4: pp. 129-30]). 
What else, then, might be better explained by utility scales 
showing strength of preference than by mere preference orderings? 
People, i t  seems clear, evince preferences in ways other than by 
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making choices: on receiving news, for instance, they often show joy 
or disappointment. The intensity of these involuntary reactions to 
news might best be explained by the strengths of certain prefer- 
ences: strong joy, for instance, might best be explained by the 
subject's having a strong preference for the news he has just received 
over what he previously thought true. If so, different utility scales 
that were ordinally alike might differ in their power to explain 
observations. 
Another kind of observation that might better be explained by 
utility scales than by mere preference orderings is suggested by 
Harsanyi [3]. Take a characteristic C which a person can acquire and 
lose, and observe the choices of a person familiar both with having it 
and with lacking it. Suppose that, with other personal characteristics 
held fixed in some way B, a person with characteristic C prefers state 
w to state x, and a person lacking C prefers state y to state z. Take 
someone familiar both with having B and C in states w and x and 
with having B and lacking C in states y and z. Tell him he will have 
characteristics B, and that he will have an even chance of having C or 
lacking it. Then offer him a choice between the following two 
gambles: ( ! )  State w if he has C, state z if he lacks C (2) Statex if 
he has C, state y if he lacks C If he prefers (1), we can explain his 
choice by saying that people maximize expected preference satis- 
faction, and that among people with other characteristics B, the 
preference of a person with characteristic C for w over x is stronger 
than the preference of a person without C for y over z. This 
comparison of preference strength goes beyond what can be said 
merely with individual preference orderings. 
Note that interpersonal comparisons of levels of utility might be 
explanatory in a similar way: To find out whether, other character- 
istics held fixed in some way, it is better to be in state x with 
characteristic C or in state y without C offer someone familiar with 
both situations the choice. If he prefers x with C that can be 
explained by saying, other characteristics held fixed in the way in 
question, a person in state x with C is better off than a person iny  
without C It is presumably tests of this kind that would give 
empirical significance to the theory Arrow gives in Section 7 of his 
paper. 
There are, I think, three main questions to ask about the 
experiments proposed by Harsanyi. In the first place, would the 
experiments give consistent results? Would the results of the 
experiments, in other words, all be explicable by the hypothesis that 
subjects maximize expected utility on a single cardinal scale, which 
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gives level of  utility as a function of  a person's characteristics and 
external situation? In particular, will a person who has a character- 
istic C but knows what it would be like to lack it choose the same 
gambles as an otherwise similar person who lacks C but knows what 
it would be like to have it? In the second place, if the results o f  
Harsanyi experiments indeed can be explained as expected utility 
maximization on an interpersonally applicable scale, is that the best 
explanation of  the results? In the third place, if that is the best 
explanation, does the utility scale that figures in the explanation 
have ethical significance? 
These are not questions I know how to answer. What I have tried 
to do is to take Harsanyi's challenge to Basic Ordinalism and ask the 
right questions about it. The appeal of  Basic Ordinalism ig, as I have 
said, epistemological. I have tried to put the argument for Basic 
Ordinalism in terms of  explanatory power, or more specifically, in 
terms of  the relation better explains. The main epistemological 
questions about a program such as Harsanyi's are, if I am right, 
questions about explanation, and good answers to those questions 
would require a good theory of  explanation. 
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